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The Foundation for a Renewed Afghan–U.S. Partnership
The next durable Afghan–U.S. partnership must begin before Washington commits again: with Afghans demonstrating that they are committed to one another.
Afghanistan’s present crisis is commonly understood through its most visible features: the Taliban’s repressive rule, the denial of basic rights—especially those of women and girls—and the continuing fragmentation of the political and armed forces opposing it. These conditions are urgent, but they are also the latest expressions of a deeper and more persistent problem.
Afghanistan has long been trapped in a vicious cycle in which internal political fragmentation enables external competition, and external competition deepens that fragmentation. Divided Afghan political actors have repeatedly sought support from different regional powers to strengthen their own positions. Those powers, in turn, have used relationships with competing Afghan leaders and groups to protect or advance their interests. Political competition within Afghanistan consequently becomes connected to competition among outside powers, making compromise at home less rewarding and conflict more difficult to end.
Five decades of war have weakened Afghanistan’s institutions and economy so severely that substantial foreign support remains essential. The problem is therefore not foreign support itself. The challenge is to secure and sustain beneficial international support without allowing competing foreign interests to operate through Afghanistan’s internal divisions. When Afghanistan receives significant assistance from a major international partner, rival powers often respond by supporting competing Afghan actors. Without sufficient political commitment among Afghans, necessary international support can consequently become part of the cycle of fragmentation and conflict.
The central challenge is therefore not to eliminate foreign involvement, which is neither realistic nor necessarily desirable. It is to develop sufficient political commitment among Afghans to sustain beneficial international partnerships, manage competing outside interests and prevent foreign competition from producing another cycle of internal conflict.
The Missing Foundation of the Former Partnership
For twenty years, the United States invested heavily in Afghanistan’s institutions, public services and security. That effort created real achievements. Millions of Afghans gained access to education, health care, media and economic opportunity. Women and girls entered public life on a scale that had previously seemed impossible. Afghan institutions developed capabilities that should not be dismissed simply because the Republic ultimately collapsed.
Yet the partnership never acquired a sufficiently strong Afghan political foundation. Too many Afghan leaders treated access to external support as a substitute for the harder work of building trust, accepting limits on power and sustaining a common national purpose. Political competition became personalized and fragmented. Different leaders cultivated different outside relationships. Rival regional powers supported competing Afghan actors, including the Taliban insurgency, and used Afghanistan’s divisions to weaken the state and the U.S.–Afghan partnership.
The United States therefore faced a structural problem that money, military capability and technical assistance could not solve on their own: it lacked a sufficiently united and reliable Afghan political counterpart. This was not the only reason the Republic collapsed, and acknowledging it does not excuse failures by Afghan or American officials. It identifies a lesson that should guide any future relationship. External support can strengthen Afghan commitment, but it cannot create that commitment or substitute for it.
The missed opportunity was not that the United States failed to carry Afghanistan indefinitely. It was that Afghans did not build enough political cohesion to turn extraordinary American support into a self-sustaining national project. A future partnership must begin by correcting that weakness.
The Afghan Covenant Must Come First
Afghanistan does not need unanimous agreement among all Afghans before political progress can begin. Nor does it need a completed constitution or comprehensive peace settlement at the outset. The process can begin more realistically: with a small number of consequential Afghan political leaders making a workable and demonstrable commitment to one another.
That initial covenant would be a commitment to pursue a shared political future rather than seek power separately through violence or competing foreign patrons. Its participants would accept that no one faction can safely take everything, and that each protects its own future by accepting the same limits on power that it expects others to respect. They would commit to widening participation, protecting basic rights, especially the rights of women and girls, and resolving political differences through agreed rules rather than force.
This is enlightened self-interest in practical form. Afghan leaders do not need to abandon their identities, constituencies or political ambitions. They need to recognize that uncontrolled competition repeatedly destroys the very power, security and social base they seek to preserve. A credible covenant would make cooperation at home more rewarding than dependence on rival outside support.
The initial commitment must be judged by conduct, not declarations. Its credibility would grow when participating leaders coordinate political positions, honor common decisions, reject factional violence, resist efforts to divide them through competing patronage, and accept that future authority must be shared and limited. As participation and public support expand, the initial compact could develop step by step into a broader National Covenant with greater national legitimacy.
A broader covenant would also enable Afghans to approach international partners from a more coherent position. It could not eliminate competition among foreign powers, but it could reduce their ability to exploit internal divisions, help preserve beneficial international partnerships and prevent foreign competition from driving another cycle of Afghan conflict.
Why This Comes Before a Covenant with the United States
A strategic relationship requires two parties capable of making and sustaining commitments. The United States can define its interests, offer political engagement and provide different forms of support. But it cannot decide on behalf of Afghans what political future they will defend together. Without an Afghan commitment, Washington would again face fragmented interlocutors, competing promises and uncertain implementation.
The simplest test is also the most important: if Afghan leaders are not committed to a better future for their own country, and are not committed to one another, how can they make a credible commitment to the United States? An Afghan covenant would answer that question through evidence. It would create a more coherent political counterpart able to negotiate responsibly, carry obligations across changes in leadership and protect a partnership from internal rivalry and regional pressure.
Afghan commitment first does not mean that the United States must wait passively until a perfect national consensus appears. Early American political attention, dialogue and encouragement can help create space for Afghan cooperation. The distinction is that major or durable U.S. commitments should reinforce demonstrated Afghan political commitment rather than be expected to manufacture it.
Why a Renewed Partnership Serves American Interests
The end of the American military mission did not end Afghanistan’s relevance to the United States. Afghanistan remains located at the meeting point of South Asia, Central Asia and the broader Middle East. Developments there affect terrorist threats, regional stability, human rights and the balance of influence in a region where American access and leverage are limited.
A renewed relationship need not reproduce the scale, cost or model of the previous intervention. Its value would lie in preserving informed political access, improving regional understanding, supporting credible Afghan partners, limiting the space available to terrorist organizations, defending basic rights and giving the United States additional strategic options as conditions evolve.
Such a partnership would also support a wider principle important to American policy: states should be able to maintain their sovereignty without becoming arenas for proxy competition or coercive regional influence. A more coherent Afghanistan would be better able to engage all of its neighbors while preventing any one outside power from determining its internal politics. That outcome would serve Afghan independence and American interests at the same time.
A Different Kind of Afghan–U.S. Covenant
The proposed Afghan–U.S. covenant is not a request for an immediate military return, an open-ended financial commitment or the restoration of the former Republic. It is a framework for rebuilding strategic trust gradually, on the basis of performance, mutual interest and political reality.
On the Afghan side, the foundation would be a credible political commitment among consequential leaders: to cooperate across factional lines, protect basic rights, prevent terrorism, maintain Afghanistan’s independence, and pursue power through a widening political process rather than violence or competing foreign sponsorship.
On the American side, a renewed commitment could begin with sustained political engagement and structured dialogue. As Afghan credibility grows, the relationship could expand to include diplomatic support, policy coordination, assistance for human rights and civil society, technical cooperation, regional consultation and carefully designed measures addressing shared security concerns. The exact form and scale should depend on conditions and verified conduct, not on assumptions or personal assurances.
This approach would give both sides greater protection against another failed partnership. Afghan leaders would know that durable American support depends on their ability to sustain common commitments. American policymakers would have clearer standards by which to assess unity, reliability and political purpose before expanding engagement. Progress could be incremental, reversible when commitments are broken and strengthened when they are honored.
The covenant would not require the United States and Afghan partners to agree on every political question. Strategic partnerships rarely do. It would require enough agreement on essential purposes: an Afghanistan that does not threaten the United States or its allies, does not provide safe haven to international terrorists, protects the basic rights of its citizens, resolves political competition without recurring war and maintains the sovereign capacity to engage regional powers without becoming dependent on any one of them.
Peaceful Politics, Accountability and the Risk of Renewed War
Peaceful political action must remain the first course of action. Afghanistan’s experience shows that opposition to a common adversary does not by itself produce lasting unity. Armed coalitions can fragment when their immediate objective is achieved, especially when their members pursue separate claims to power or depend on different regional patrons.
If every peaceful avenue is exhausted and armed resistance nevertheless becomes unavoidable, political agreement must precede and govern it. Any armed effort must remain subordinate to a common political purpose, protect civilians and serve a negotiated peace. It must not become a collection of competing military projects or a channel through which rival powers reproduce another proxy war.
For American policymakers, this distinction is essential. Support for fragmented actors without an agreed political framework could recreate the conditions that have repeatedly produced conflict after apparent victory. A credible initial covenant would provide a political test: whether those seeking international engagement are prepared to limit their own ambitions, remain accountable to shared commitments and prevent resistance from becoming another struggle for unilateral power.
What Afghan Covenant Forum Does
Afghan Covenant Forum (ACF) is a policy, research and dialogue initiative. It is not a political party, government-in-waiting or negotiating delegation. Its purpose is to develop, test and advocate the two connected commitments on which a different future partnership must rest: first, a credible covenant among consequential Afghan political leaders; and second, on that foundation, a renewed and durable Afghan–U.S. strategic relationship.
ACF examines the causes and consequences of Afghan political fragmentation, the ways regional competition operates through domestic divisions, the practical meaning of political restraint, the lessons of the Republic, and the interests that could sustain a new relationship with the United States. It translates that work into policy analysis, articles, longer papers, consultations and dialogue intended for Afghan, American and wider international audiences.
ACF’s role is to make the case, subject it to serious scrutiny and bring it into policy debate. It seeks engagement with people and institutions that can challenge its assumptions, improve its proposals and help determine what evidence of Afghan commitment would be persuasive to the United States. These consultations are designed to strengthen analysis and build understanding; they are not political negotiations.
The Outcome We Seek
The goal is not to recreate the past or ask the United States to solve Afghanistan’s problems. It is to enable Afghans to become a more reliable partner in solving problems that matter to both countries.
A functioning Afghanistan would have political power that is shared and limited, political differences resolved peacefully, basic rights protected and institutions capable of governing. It would not provide safe haven to terrorist groups or live under the constant threat of another internal war. It would engage the United States and other international partners from a coherent national position while maintaining constructive relations with its neighbours and protecting its independence.
This will not begin with a perfect national settlement. It can begin with a smaller act of political responsibility: consequential Afghan leaders demonstrating that they can commit to one another before asking America to commit again.
Before the world commits, Afghans must.
Independent Analysis.
Practical Dialogue.
ACF advances evidence-based analysis and fosters constructive dialogue on Afghanistan’s political future.
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